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 Getting the ‘sand’ out of Africa’s
food system
African agriculture receives considerable
attention from the international donor
community yet few of these initiatives pay
attention to the price farmers receive for their
product. If we want to increase productivity in
the agricultural sector then it is time to look
beyond farming to other constraints hindering
the industry’s development.
The sustainability of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa
continues to raise concerns. Evidence from a number of
countries in the region depicts an ominous secular decline in per
capita food production over the period during which most
countries gained their independence in the early 1960s.  While
there are many explanations for this trend, one plausible reason
is found in the nature and quality of the economic
infrastructure in much of the continent. There are two kinds of
infrastructure of importance for development — the
“hardware” and the “software.”  The hardware consists of
roads, rail networks, bridges, and communications. The
software consists in the institutional architecture of an
economy. The two infrastructures work together to determine
the efficacy with which the economy can accomplish its
necessary signalling. If roads, rail, bridges, and
telecommunications are in serious disrepair, even the most
effective institutional arrangements will be unable to create the
conditions of high productivity and the prospects for growth.
On the other hand, if the physical assets are ideal, and yet the
legal and customary arrangements enable or encourage theft,
bribery, and other forms of predatory behaviour, economic
performance and livelihoods will suffer.
Studies of institutional problems in marketing and transport
have increased our understanding of this important component
of a nation’s economy. This literature makes a distinction
between corruption that facilitates transactions (“grease”) and
corruption that impedes transactions (“sand”).
Sand in the wheels
One study suggests that uncertainty related to inland transport
times is more deleterious to exports than are the delays driven
by the process of obtaining proper documents in ports. In fact,
a one-day extension of “inland transit time” seems to be
associated with a 13 percent reduction in exports. Unlike port
delays, in which case trucking firms are dealing with a small
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delays, in which case trucking firms are dealing with a small
and reasonably stable set of inspectors, the situation along
several thousand kilometres of roads entails constant
interference from an unpredictable group of officials
representing customs bureaus, police, army security guards, and
truckers’ unions. Here, unlike payments to expedite processing,
a truck on a long-haul trip is out of the control of the exporter
or the importer. This corruption introduces unwanted “sand”
into the African food system.
Recent research for USAID’s West Africa Trade Hub on bribes
and delays along the transport corridors of West Africa reveals
exactly what is at stake. Corruption strips out income that
could go to farmers, thereby reducing farm-gate prices. This
serves to reduce net returns to specific crops and discourages
production. These suppressed prices then distort cropping
choices away from crops intended for urban markets or for
export. Additionally, delays at numerous check-points means
that vegetables spend more time in transit under hot conditions
and so spoilage is increased. Finally, the food crops that do
manage to arrive at urban markets are more expensive than
they would be without corruption. This happens because
transport firms must charge more in order to cover the
additional costs of bribes and delays along the way. Over the
long run, each of these forms of “sand in the gears of
commerce” poses a serious threat to the sustainability of
agricultural systems in Africa. I draw on recent research
concerning the implications of bribes and transit delays for
onions, shea, and cashew.
One data set covered only legal trucks (1/3 of the total trucks
on the corridor). Legal trucks are those with all of their licenses
and certifications in good order. The non-legal trucks are
“wildcat” operators who lack proper papers, are always over-
weight, and whose trucks reveal serious mechanical and safety
defects. The study showed that for the 1/3 of the trucks that are
properly registered and certified, trucks hauling shea from
Bamako, Mali (1,500 km to Accra, Ghana), and cashew from
central Ghana to Accra (435 km), were exposed to corruption
costs equal to 15-20% of total transport costs. A second study
covered both legal and illegal trucks hauling onions from
Madaoua, Niger to Accra, Ghana (1,994 km). Here, corruption
costs are almost 30% of total transport costs.
The research suggests that a 10% reduction in total transport
costs — actual costs plus corruption costs along each corridor
— could yield price increases to farmers of 12-13% for onions,
2% for cashews, and 12% for shea. The low price premium for
eliminating corruption in the cashew transport system in Ghana
reflects the shorter distances involved (less scope for delays and
bribes at fewer check-points), plus a slightly less aggressive level
of bribes in Ghana.
Stripping economic value
It is clear that corruption and other problems in the transport
sector strip economic value out of the agricultural sector—for
the export terminal at Tema, Ghana for shea and cashew, and
the urban onion market in Accra.  As above, with economic
returns to agriculture suppressed in this manner, the net
profitability of these commodities is undermined.  When net
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profitability of these commodities is undermined.  When net
returns are suppressed, investment is postponed or forsaken
entirely, yields fall, net returns suffer yet another blow, and
farmers are caught in a cycle of falling productivity, reduced
critical mass of tradable production, and perhaps even higher
costs to arrange shipments.  Shea trees become vulnerable to
clearance for cotton or other crops.  Cashew gives way to other
enterprises.  Onion cultivation ceases and the land reverts back
to desert.
African agriculture receives considerable attention from the
international donor community. Prominent in that attention is
concern for increasing yields, adopting GMO crops, using more
fertiliser, and rehabilitating defunct irrigation systems.
Sometimes, extension programs deliver necessary assistance.
Notice that none of these initiatives pays attention to the price
farmers receive for their product. If someone told an African
farmer that tomorrow he might be able to receive a price
increase of, perhaps 10-15% for his production, he would be
quite pleased. When he was also told that he would not have to
do anything in order to receive this generous bonus, his interest
would be seriously enhanced. Then, if someone would tell the
millions of customers of the crowded urban food markets of
Accra, Lomé, Cotonou, Abidjan, Ouagadougou, Bamako, and
Ndjamena that tomorrow there would be more produce on
offer, and at a lower price, they would be pleasantly surprised.
The money is there to accomplish these goals—it merely needs
to be re-directed away from the current system which haunts
and terrorises the transport corridors of West Africa. It is time
to get the “sand” out of the gears of the West African food
system.
